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ABSTRACT

From the late 1960s to the spring of 1970 there was an acceleration of anti-war protest and political movements. At Stanford University this period was characterized by controversy, deep divisions within the university community, disruption of classes, student strikes, and the presence of uniformed police on campus. In this environment of turbulence and violence, a major decision was reached to remove ROTC from Stanford. It was a decision that raised questions concerning the legitimacy of the governing role of the board of trustees, the president, the faculty and the students. It caused a crisis in the decision-making process and an altering of the power structure of the university. It extended beyond the single topic of ROTC, beyond the question of legitimate authority, to include such matters as the ethics of classified research, rivalry between academic disciplines, and the very fundamental question of academic freedom. This document attempts to identify and analyze, from a political perspective, the decision-making process that produced the "ROTC decision." It begins with an exploration of the Stanford decision-making system and proceeds to describe the "political perspective." (Author/KE)

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WHO SANK THE KHAKI SUBMARINE AT STANFORD?

A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY

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INTRODUCTION

Chants of "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Min . . . NLF is gonna win," precede a railroad spike smashing through the huge smoked glass window of the library wing where a scholar pores over reference works. The fragrance of blossoms is overwhelmed by mushrooming clouds of tear gas from cannisters fired by Sheriff's Deputies cordoning the campus. Helmeted police with riot sticks rush students. Students dash to new points of confrontation in a "Danse Macabre" through the gathering darkness of a warm Spring evening. Crisis reaction meetings are taking place behind doors closed to rampaging mobs of students. Academic colleagues bitterly assail one another with verbal cannonades.

It was apparent that the mood of the students from the late 1960's to the spring of 1970 was political. There was an acceleration of anti-war protest and political movements during this period. In addition, this mood of activism and desire for change was shared by many faculty members. At Stanford University this period was characterized by controversy, deep divisions within the University community, disruption of classes, student strikes, and the presence of uniformed police on campus.

In this environment of turbulence and violence, a major decision was reached to remove ROTC from Stanford. It was a decision that raised questions concerning the legitimacy of the governing role of the Board of Trustees, the president, the faculty, and the students. It caused a crisis in the decision-making process and an altering of the power structure of the University. It extended beyond the single topic of ROTC, beyond the question of legitimate authority, to include such matters as the ethics of classified research, rivalry between academic

disciplines, and the very fundamental question of academic freedom. In short, ROTC was the victim of a broader struggle -- a confrontation of groups polarized by the Vietnamese war and other conflicting social values. It was a situation ready-made for a classical struggle of competing interest groups for power and influence.

Our goal is to identify and analyze, from a political perspective, the decision-making processes that produced the "ROTC decision." We begin with an exploration of the Stanford decision-making system and proceed to describe the "political perspective." We can then turn to the events for an intensive analysis and appropriate conclusions.

THE STANFORD DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM

An analysis of decision-making at Stanford cannot occur without some prior knowledge of the formal University system for institutional decision-making. The major components of the system are diagrammed in Figure I. The two principle decision-making bodies in the ROTC decision were the office of the president and the faculty governing body (Senate and Academic Council). The historical development and pattern of interaction of these two entities are described in this section. (The reader may find it helpful to refer back to Figure I as the discussion progresses).

The tradition of a strong presidency was assured both by the Founding Grant and the appointment by Senator Leland Stanford of the University's first president, David Starr Jordan. The Founding Grant proscribed that the Board of Trustees would give the president necessary power to "control the educational part of the University to such an extent

that he may justly be held responsible for the course of study therein and for the good conduct and capacity of the professors and teachers." The Board of Trustees had also delegated to the president additional authority to manage the day-to-day operations of the physical plant and the administration of the University's extensive business activities.

Figure I: Stanford Decision-Making System



Of the several strong presidents Stanford has had since Jordan, J. Wallace Sterling, appointed in 1949, had a most profound and far-reaching impact. He and his provost, Frederick Terman, literally remade Stanford, and, in the process, it was inevitable that many traditions would crumble.

The 1960's under Sterling's administration were the most dramatic years in the history of the University. During this decade the enrollment rose from 8,786 to 11,599 students, the number of faculty members doubled, and the operating budget more than tripled to over 130 million dollars. Stanford became an outstanding, international university almost overnight.

But there were other consequences which became more disturbing with every passing year. Much of Stanford's 8,000 acre campus is not devoted to academic purposes. Accordingly, the Sterling-Terman policy to maximize the revenue-producing qualities of Stanford's land resource through long-term leasing arrangements with private enterprise was developed. This had the result of aligning Stanford and its administrators with powerful business interests. The disproportionate rapid expansion of science and technology on the campus, coupled with the solicitation of federal research funds, linked Stanford closely with the Federal government.

The Sterling-Terman policies also had a profound effect on campus governance. The University had become too big and too diverse to be run directly from the president's office with a limited administrative staff. Many of the new faculty members had yet to develop a strong identification with Stanford; thus their first allegiance was with their discipline, their second with the professoriate. However, where faculty matters were relevant, Stanford professors increasingly desired a share in decision-making.

Students also desired to share in this University decision-making. As a veteran Stanford presidential advisor recalls,

> There was a change in the air. . . . As the Vietnam War started there was a growing concern both among the faculty and among the students for participation in governance.[1]

Dr. Sterling responded by increasing the staff of his office and later by commissioning a major review of Stanford's educational policies called the Study of Education at Stanford (SES). This study, completed in 1967-68, recommended a conveyance of greater power to the faculty. This resulted in creation of the Faculty Senate.

When Dr. Kenneth Pitzer assumed the presidency in December of 1968, he inherited an office and administration quite unlike the one held by Dr. Sterling. He found ". . . [the] erosion of presidential power . . . caused great difficulties."[2] The growing need for rapid and effective decision-making, the decentralization of power, and Dr. Pitzer's lack of familiarity with the changes in University governance and the forces behind them meant that even greater responsibility for decision-making would necessarily shift to the faculty.

However, it is worth noting that even prior to this period, the Stanford faculty had not been totally powerless, at least in theory. From 1891 until 1904 there was a loosely knit governmental organization of the teaching staff which included a University Council (comprised of all members of the teaching staff and chief administrative officials), University committees, and departmentalized faculties. In 1904 the University had become a firm reality, and Mrs. Stanford relinquished her founding grant powers to a self-perpetuating Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees was concerned over the amount of control which had been delegated to the

presidency during the infancy of the University and the absence of the faculty in governing affairs. Thus, they sought a structure which would involve the faculty more fully in the affairs of the University. They recognized that lack of faculty participation would ". . . stifle the sense of responsibility. Public spirit dies when we [faculty] are debarred from public action. Professors are interested in their departments but nobody except the president considers officially the whole university or participates officially in its control."[3]

The trustees deliberately sought a system of faculty participation in University affairs which would lessen the chance of hasty action by the president and yet provide him with a group of officially elected counselors (rather than personal appointees) with whom to consult about the internal operation of the institution. The trustees, as busy men of affairs, sought to establish a form of operation which would not necessitate their involvement in internal matters.

In 1904 the trustees approved the establishment of an Academic Council in place of the University Council and thus added political flesh to the ineffective skeleton of faculty government which had operated under the firm control of the president. The supremacy of the Academic Council was made "definite and clear" and it claimed responsibility "for the internal administration of the University, . . . subject to the powers and duties vested in the trustees."[4] Part of this authority can be seen in the way the existing committees were specifically designated as committees of the Academic Council, subject to instruction from and required to report to the Council rather than to the president. The departmentalized faculties were left unchanged except that they too were required to accept their instruction from and report to the Council.

Whether the president considered this new faculty organization as a serious constraint to his powers and to his personal style of operation is not known but Dr. Jordan did write at one point that "there are two universities, the one as seen by the faculty, the other as seen by the Board. I try to ride both horses as it were. They will coalesce sooner or later but I may fall in between."[5] Kenneth Pitzer may have had similar sentiments in 1970.

Little else occurred to drastically alter the faculty structure for the next 54 years until in 1968 the need to reflect the increased size and complexity of the faculty and the university itself resulted in a revision of their governmental system. But, as we have noted, the tradition of faculty prerogative and autonomy in dealing with affairs of the university was firmly established and sanctioned by the trustees. That the faculty seldom chose to exercise this responsibility is similar in the pattern of faculty governments throughout the nation. Concern with professionalization and research, the withdrawal of faculty from operational concerns and the relative stability (if not affluence) of the American collegiate system all permitted the faculty to take a complacent rear seat and rely on the hopefully strong leadership of the president of the institution.

With the beginning of the student activist movement in the early sixties the Stanford faculty, along with their colleagues on other campuses, was called upon to review its relationship with the institution it served. A new awareness of social conscience and commitments saw the development of a new Articles of Organization of the Faculty and a Charter of the Senate. Ratified by the Board of Trustees in 1968 the reorganization reconfirmed the power of the faculty to make internal

institutional decisions. It also provided for a Senate. This body was to be in addition to the Academic Council (which included all members of the professoriate) with a membership to be based on major constituencies and assigned according to the number of students and the number of faculty members associated with each school or department. The Senate became the operational branch of the faculty governmental structure. A Committee on Committees, responsible to the Senate and to the Academic Council, was created to handle the appointment of faculty members to working committees. (See Figure #1).

It was President Sterling who presided over this reorganization, Acting President Glaser implemented the structure and President-designate Pitzer inherited it in a newly roused state. The educational literature of the sixties exhorted faculties to concern themselves with the futures of their colleges and universities and to bring their professional wisdom to bear not only on the society but on the institutions which they had neglected over the years. This the Stanford faculty was attempting to do using long dormant powers and previously delegated responsibilities.

These changes intensified already widely differing perspectives of University goals held by the various elements of the campus community. The situation was ripe then for one sociologist's contention "that to the extent that organizational goals are diffuse or lacking in clarity and to the extent that multiple, possibly conflicting, goals are being pursued, the organization will lack the rational basis for making . . . critical decisions."[6]

CONCEPTUAL MODELS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING ANALYSIS

Before we begin a reconstruction of the events resulting in the end of ROTC at Stanford, we must digress to examine the various means of organizational analysis. The analytical tools we select will largely determine our success at identifying the crucial variables underlying the Stanford decision to oust ROTC. Appendix B contains a detailed description of the three most prominent theoretical models to analyze ongoing organizational processes.

As we note therein, although all three models apply in some respects to University policy formation and decision-making, the nature of the University and particularly Stanford University in the late 1960's, suggests that the political model will be the most effective analytical tool.

However, to say that we are going to use a political model without further qualification is analagous to a customer telling a suit salesman he wants a suit without specifying worsted material, patch pockets, and other details that are needed. We use a systems approach to serve as a framework for the details and the organizing concepts in the political model.

The canonical systems model is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: General Systems Model



The "system" in this analysis is the decision-making entities at the University and the outputs are decisions (and in particular the ROTC decision). The inputs in the general systems model are relevant parameters such as capital, labor, raw materials, and environmental factors that are processed by the "system" to produce the output. The purpose of the overlying model (rational man, bureaucratic, or political) is to serve as a sieve to determine in particular what inputs the analyst should consider as well as some indication of the inner machinations of the "system" to produce the output.

Thus, archetypic inputs for a rational man model might include value structure, decision alternatives, probability assignments, and the like. An analyst, using a bureaucratic model would consider inputs such as hierarchial arrangements, precedents, and standard operating procedures. In contrast, using a political model, the inputs are the goals and tactics of the competing political coalitions that attempt to influence the "system," the decision-making bodies at Stanford.

Frequently the analyst is not concerned with the inner mechanisms that map the input set into the output set. In addition, as noted, environmental factors are normally considered as inputs. However, the analysis of the ROTC decision is considerably enhanced by explicit representation of the inputs, the decision-making system and an encircling environment as shown in Figure 3.

A word or two of explanation is necessary regarding Figure 3. The arrows from the input to the decision system show where the inputs "plugged" into the system; the breadth of the arrow is a qualitative depiction of the amount of effort the input groups expended on "plugging" into the system. The divisions within the decision systems are barriers to flow of

Figure 3: Political Systems Model



influence. The environment, affecting both input groups and the decision-making system, is shown as an encompassing sphere.

As a concrete example, DOD exerted their greatest influence on the President and the Administration with much lesser contact with the Board of Trustees and none on the faculty. Thus, the DOD pressure was filtered through the President's office and was greatly reduced before reaching the faculty decision-making bodies. In addition, the environment (Vietnamese War, liberal climate in the Bay Area, etc.) affected DOD as well as the other players in the decision process. This amalgamated-modified systems-political model is the framework for our decision analysis.

POINT-COUNTERPOINT: THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND DECISIONS

A decision, particularly a decision reached by a complex organization such as a university, is not like an Olympic race. There is no gun to signal the start of the process, no bell lap to signify the process is close to finish, and no breaking of the tape to signify a completion. Certainly no bells rang from Hoover Tower to announce the start of the Stanford "ROTC decision" at the beginning of the summer of 1968. Yet one must begin somewhere, there must be some awareness of a need for a decision. A collaboration during that summer between Anne Kostelanetz, Assistant Professor of English, and Joseph Sneed, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, produced the requisite awareness and resulted, some five years later, in the cessation of ROTC activities at Stanford. This is our beginning.

The Army ROTC had opened its doors in 1919. At that time the University President, Ray Lyman Wilbur, stated:

> Our University . . . thinks with pride of the men who are representing it in all branches of national service. . . . It is most important for the type of man who comes to our university to realize that he must allow his country to make the fullest use of his developed and latent talents in solving the intricate problems brought to the surface by the war. . . .[7]

The Army ROTC program became an accepted and traditional part of the University and in 1946 was joined by a Navy ROTC program and an Air Force ROTC program. In the 1960's a process of profound environmental change occurred with growing concern over U. S. foreign and domestic policy. The Armed Services were slow to react to this new environment. As a consequence, ROTC institutional behavior, programs, and responses, conditioned on the years of "tradition," were no longer appropriate. The presence of ROTC, once considered a matter of pride by an institution desiring to serve its country, was now perceived by some as an albatross around the university's neck, particularly by the "new breed" of college professor.

Professors Sneed and Kostelanetz, two young and non-tenured members of the School of Humanities and Science, were part of this "new breed." As Professor Kostelanetz, who was described as a "mini-skirted English professor" by the San Francisco Chronicle,[8] stated:

> A generation gap probably does exist between junior and senior faculty, both at Stanford and throughout the nation. The junior faculty, having come of age under Kennedy, believes in rapid reforms. . . . Like many students, the junior faculty often questions the validity and justice of many existing laws and regulations.[9]

To initiate the reform of the ROTC, the two professors, during the summer of 1968, collected data on the ROTC curriculum and ROTC faculty credentials. Based on their analysis, they presented a proposal for

consideration by the Faculty Senate during the fall of 1968. Apparently the two collaborators thought their actions would discomfit the Department of Defense and the Johnson Administration with no harm to the University.[10] Professor Kostelanetz's publicly avowed motivation for the proposal was, "We sensed it [ROTC] was going to be controversial so we acted to stop the riot."[11] Events later proved that only the first half of this statement was accurate.

The two professors carefully framed their propposition so that it fell within the domain of a faculty decision-making group. Professors Sneed and Kostelanetz argued that the ROTC program compromised the academic integrity of Stanford's degrees and faculty, and it was ". . . incompatible with the University's commitment to encourage the free intellectual development of all its students."[12] The duo made a strong point that, ". . . we believe that ultimate responsibility for evaluating all University programs on these particular grounds properly lies exclusively with the faculty" and ". . . we do so with the desire to focus on issues which are undeniably the legitimate concern of Stanford faculty members, as faculty members. There can be no doubt that our proposal is a proper matter for consideration by the Academic Senate."[13]

The proposal, cosigned by eight other faculty members included five "guidelines":

1. No academic credit for any Military Science Department course.
2. Regular departments of the University could offer courses pertinent to Military Science.
3. No member of the staff of Military Science should be a member of the Academic Council.
4. ROTC would be a voluntary activity on the campus.

5. No Stanford faculty member or administrator, acting for the University, could encourage student participation in ROTC.

The Sneed/Kostelanetz proposal was presented to the Senate on September 26, 1968, and the Senate, approving the spirit but not the full details of the proposal, resolved that:

> It is the sense of the Senate that the ROTC program should be altered but that proper relations between the ROTC departments and Stanford may be established by review and reform of the present relations.[14]

The Senate resolution further created an implementing ad-hoc committee (known as the Connolly Committee after its chairman, Thomas J. Connolly, Professor of Mechanical Engineering) to report back to the full Senate no later than January 15, 1969 (later extended to February 15, 1969).

The University Administration at that time felt that the Senate ". . . emphasized 'reform' as distinct from 'abolition,'" and was ". . . confident that this study [by the Ad Hoc Committee] will be conducted in a fair and judicious manner."[15]

However, the Senate Committee on Committees, with perhaps Machevallian intent and unheeding of the old adage of never mixing the sheep and the wolves, appointed an oddly dichotomous committee. The Connolly Committee of nine members included on one side the Professor of Naval Science, a student who was the Cadet Colonel in the Air Force ROTC, and the Vice Provost, a "strong believer" in the ROTC. The opposition included Professor Kostelanetz as well as other professors active in the anti-war movement.

Thus it is not surprising that the committee split 6 to 3, with both a majority and a minority report being returned to the Senate.

The Majority Report defined the University as:

> . . . a community whose members, including both faculty and students, have a primary commitment to the creation and dissemination of knowledge, in an environment of free intellectual activity.[16]

The Report, measuring the military programs against this definition, concluded:

> . . . as a formal on-campus program, sponsored, sanctioned, and partially supported by Stanford University, the ROTC program is not compatible with the University. Moreover, this incompatibility is inherent in the very nature of the ROTC programs, and therefore cannot be removed by various changes which are from time to time proposed.[17]

(So much for reform!)

The Majority Committee Report included eight recommendations:

1. After a transition period there would be no credit for military education.
2. Required military training should no longer be offered on the campus.
3. By the end of the specified period, ROTC would be a voluntary organization, and there would be no official encouragement to participate in ROTC.

(Recommendations 4, 5, and 6 pertain to the administrative process in a transition period which was to end no later than the fall term of 1973).

7. During the transition, officers of the ROTC Unit would carry the rank of Lecturer; after the fall of 1973 no rank would be accorded these officers.
8. The presently enrolled students would be able to complete the ROTC program.[18]

The Minority Report emphasized the benefit to the nation and to Stanford of the ROTC program, questioned the viability of an off-campus program, and recommended an upgraded on-campus ROTC program.

The Committee reports were presented to the Senate on February 13, 1969, only two days after release of the Committee's text. After a three hour discussion, the Senate, by a 25-8 vote (of 43 voting members present) moved to adopt Majority recommendations 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Recommendations 2 and 3 were referred to a joint faculty, administration, student, Military Science Department committee which was to assist in effecting the transition.[19]

Score: Anti-ROTC 1
Pro-ROTC 0

At this point a characteristic of the political decision-making process emerged: No decision is ever quite final. Support for ROTC appeared -- some from unlikely sources. On February 24, 1969 the student body by a vote of 2,106 to 1,397 (of 11,400 students) approved a referendum measure which stated, "ROTC has a legitimate place on campus and deserves support and credit from the University for all those parts of the program that are of genuine academic interest."[20] In addition, 69 professors petitioned the Academic Senate to present the ROTC issue to the full Academic Council at the regularly scheduled April meeting. Finally, the Board of Trustees urged President Pitzer to continue negotiations with Defense Department officials "leading to appropriate actions which will improve and vitalize this important program."[21]

Score: Anti-ROTC 1
Pro-ROTC 1

The month of March, 1969 was a period of intense activity as each side attempted to elicit support for their respective positions for the critical April Academic Council meeting. Roughly 400 of more than 1,000 faculty members attended this Spring meeting. Motions to approve the original Senate action (confirmation of the Connolly Committee Majority

Report) and to recommit the matter to the Senate for reconsideration were defeated. Finally a motion for a mail vote of the Academic Council was approved. This was the primary goal of the pro-ROTC component.[22]

However, this small tactical success was countered by a defeat at the polls. The result of the mail ballot, announced by the Academic Secretary on May 1, 1969, was a 403-356[23] vote to end credit for ROTC, some 300 professors failing to return any ballot. A year to the day later the campus would be in a state of chaos and near anarchy over this same issue.

Score: Anti-ROTC 2
Pro-ROTC 1

President-designate Kenneth Pitzer formally assumed the Presidency on December 1, 1968, relieving Robert H. Glaser, who had acted as president since President Sterling's retirement on September 1, 1968. Pitzer's early reign was marred by student disruptions of Trustee meetings, picketing of the Stanford Research Institute (a University affiliated non-profit research institute), and an extended student sit-in at the Applied Electronics Laboratory (AEL) as a protest against University-sponsored classified research. However, through April 1969 Pitzer had not been an active participant in the ROTC decision. This was soon to change.

On May 5, 1969 the Chairman of the Faculty Senate returned the ROTC question to the Administration by a letter to President Pitzer which said in part:

> On the basis of the faculty poll, which effectively eliminates academic credit for ROTC courses and regular faculty status for ROTC personnel, we believe that the main academic issues at stake have been settled.

> Under these circumstances, it seems to us appropriate that a presidential advisory committee be appointed. The main issues remaining are administrative ones. . . . If, however, substantial academic problems were to arise, we would hope that you would turn again to the Senate for advice on these issues.[24]

At the same time the Vice Provost was conducting a post mortem analysis of the ROTC ballot defeat and pointing to two critical factors which influenced the April faculty mail vote -- the violence at Harvard which precipitated the forced withdrawal of the ROTC and the success of the radical student "sit-in" at the Stanford Applied Electronics Laboratory.

On June 6, 1969, President Pitzer (based on nominations by the Faculty and Student Senates) appointed a committee of five faculty members and three students to advise him on ROTC matters during the transition period defined in the Connolly Committee Report. The Presidential Committee, originally chaired by Professor Alan S. Manne, and later by Professor J. Keith Mann, included only Professor Lyman P. Van Slyke as a hold-over from the Connolly Committee. All in all, a fair characterization of the committee was that it was considerably less polarized than the Connolly Committee (although one member felt it was "stacked" in favor of the administration.)[25]

In the summer of 1969, at the student-deserted Stanford campus, President Pitzer was beginning to feel countervailing thrusts. He was under heavy pressure from the Trustees (who had made little public comment), alumni, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard (a Stanford graduate, ex-member of the Board of Trustees, and major financial contributor to the school's endowment program). Basically, the President's inclination was that he could not completely satisfy the demands of the Academic Council as reflected by the April mail ballot.[26]

Additionally, Army officials had agreed to offer Stanford a revision to the ROTC program. The main points of the new program, developed during the summer of 1969, were:

1. Creation of a Center for Military Studies, headed by a senior Army officer who would have all rights and privileges accorded to Professors, less membership in the Academic Council.

2. Course accreditation in accordance with normal University procedures (later interpreted to mean review by the Committee on Undergraduate Studies) and granting of credit only to those courses which met established University standards.

3. Instruction in related Military Science course by the Department of History and the Department of Political Science.[27]

This modified program seemed far removed from the faculty approved Connolly Committee recommendations of the previous February. Yet President Pitzer, in a rare positive statement, forwarded the Army proposal, in October, 1969, for consideration by the Manne Committee with the endorsement, "The Army has offered substantial concessions to the University and seems to me to have met virtually every requirement. . . ."[28]

After some six weeks of study and deliberation, the Committee, by a vote of 6-2 (Professors Manne and Van Slyke dissenting), recommended to President Pitzer that he:

> . . . approve and accept the Army proposal, subject to obtaining the consent of the Faculty Senate on the proposal for the granting of academic credit on a course-by-course basis.[29]

Professors Manne and Van Slyke's dissent noted:

> Stanford is being asked to adopt the DOD's position, and thereby to reverse last spring's faculty decision. This makes the issue no longer one of ROTC alone, but also one of University governance. There <u>are</u> areas in which it is

> proper for the views of trustees and/or students to be decisive. In the matter of academic credit, we believe the faculty views ought to be decisive, and that the faculty has already expressed its views unambiguously.[30]

Several extracts from President Pitzer's memorandum forwarding the Army's proposal to the Faculty Senate reflect his position in early January of 1970:

> "I should state that I, personally, find the Army proposal reasonable and acceptable, and very close indeed to the recommendations adopted by the Senate on February 13, 1969."
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "The question of granting limited academic credit is the crux of the matter. . . ."
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "Subject to the Senate approval of the credit mechanism, I intend to accept the Army proposal and put it into effect as rapidly as possible."
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "It is a matter of considerable University interest that a reasonable compromise . . . be reached. There are substantital numbers in the faculty and in the student body who wish to see ROTC continued in some form. . . ."[31]

The recommendation was the major agendum of the January 22, 1970, Academic Senate meeting. After three hours of debate, discussion, and inconclusive alternative motions, the Senate, by a vote of 23 to 13 (10 members not voting and seven absent) approved a motion to adopt the Army's proposal on a one year trial basis.[32]

Score: Anti-ROTC 2
Pro-ROTC 2

This unexpected and stunning reversal of positions was the start of three months of violence, unprecedented in Stanford history. As one

observer noted, "This was the first time they (the Off-ROTC Movement) felt they might lose"[33] and this loss was not acceptable.

The Senate motion was met with the usual torrent of Movement broadsides and letters to the Stanford Daily as well as a request (signed by 141 faculty members) to have the matter considered by a special meeting of the Academic Council.[34] In light of several post hoc analyses, portions of this petition are illuminating: "Resolved, that the Academic Council reject the decision of the Academic Senate . . . with respect to the continued presence of ROTC at Stanford . . ." and ". . . the retention, in any form, of a military program of the United States Government which directly and adversely affects the lives of large numbers of innocent people is repugnant to many members of the community."[35]

The Senate approved a mail referendum for the Academic Council consideration and on March 30th at 5:30 p.m. the results were announced: 390-375 (of over 1,000 professors) for approval of the year's trial program[36] (and this from a faculty that less than 11 months earlier had voted 403-356 to effectively decimate the ROTC program).

Score: Anti-ROTC 2
Pro-ROTC 3

It took the opposition exactly 26 1/2 hours to assemble 800 people in the Dinkelspiel Auditorium to hear a talk sponsored by the Stanford Committee Against War and Facism. Inspired by the statement of Michael Sweeney, a student radical, that "We'll never be able to drive ROTC from campus if we just sit and talk about it," and "you can't have an ROTC program if you don't have an ROTC building," 400 participants marched to the ROTC office and attempted to board up the building.[37] However, they were turned back by a handful of athletes (the Athletic Department shared

the building with ROTC) and 40 Santa Clara County deputy sheriffs. The demonstrators were driven off after breaking several windows.

The next six weeks were a dreary scenario of repeated violence:

1. April 1, 1970 - 300 persons again tried to board up the ROTC building. Windows broken.
2. April 2, 1970 - 50 protestors attempted to "audit" an ROTC course.
3. April 7, 1970 - 75 demonstrators occupied the office of the Professor of Military Science.
4. April 9, 1970 - 300 persons backing "Off-ROTC" endorsed 11 demands, including taking control of the University from the Board of Trustees. However, a proposal to appear nude at an ROTC drill was defeated, and this alternative was left to local option.
5. April 13, 1970 - Guerilla theater style demonstrators at Navy ROTC.
6. April 15, 1970 - Student referendum - Vote 2919-2781 in favor of an on-campus ROTC but 3616-1898 opposed to academic credit (as compared to 2106-1397 in favor of credit in February, 1969).
7. April 20, 1970 - Rally at White Plaza followed by a march to the President's office to present an ultimatum to force ROTC off the campus.
8. April 21, 1970 - "Off-ROTC" sign painted on President's house. Scattered acts of vandalism.
9. April 23-24, 1970 - Sit-in at the Old Union buildings.
10. April 24, 1970 - Arson at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.
11. April 28, 1970 - Invasion of Cambodia.

This invasion precipitated, at Stanford, as at other colleges and universities across the country, a frenzy of anti-war activity, that for both quantity and quality was never again approached. Previously uncommitted faculty and students joined in collecting signatures for petitions,

teach-ins and cancellation of normal academic activities. Unfortunately, violence sullied these essentially constructive acts, and on April 29th a rock throwing, club wielding contest involved several hundred students and 275 police (some drawn from as far away as San Francisco). This fracas, which saw the first use of tear gas on the campus, resulted in 16 arrests, 30 police and a dozen students injured, and extensive "trashing."

This violence continued on April 30th. On that day, President Pitzer, in a move unanticipated by ROTC proponents, and acting because he "felt he had to,"[38] asked the Faculty Senate to reconsider the ROTC question.

The environmental pressures are acutely obvious in the Faculty Senate resolution adopted that day:

> Several recent developments call for further consideration of the ROTC negotiations, here and elsewhere: 1) President Nixon's recommendations to Congress for major changes in draft deferment patterns; 2) the recent student referendum at Stanford on continuance of ROTC and credit for ROTC; and 3) the American entry into Cambodia. Therefore:
>
> 1. The Senate of the Academic Council wishes to associate itself with President Pitzer in his proposals to return the ROTC question to the Advisory Committee on ROTC for further consideration, in the light of the above developments.[39]

The Academic Council in response to the turmoil and anguish that followed the Cambodian invasion, met in an emergency meeting on May 1st and in a divided vote of 400 members asked the Senate to consider "without delay terminating academic credit for ROTC at the end of the current academic year."[40]

Meanwhile, back on the campus, the continuing student strike to protest the invasion of Cambodia included sit-ins, picketing of classes

and departments, and complete blockage of the ROTC building (this blockade lasted over two weeks).

The Faculty Senate, in response to the Academic Council's resolution, met on May 7, 1970, and by a vote of 36-8 (4 abstentions, 5 absentees) moved to:

1. Terminate credit for ROTC courses effective August 31, 1970.

2. Request the Mann Committee (Professor Keith Mann had replaced Professor Alan Manne who had resigned on April 15th) to make recommendations for a fair and equitable means to terminate the credit.

3. Request the Mann Committee to report ". . . its recommendations as to the termination or retention and, if retained, the future conduct of any ROTC programs at Stanford. . . ."[41]

Score: Anti-ROTC 3
Pro-ROTC 3

The Mann Committee in response to this resolution made a sound (and really first) attempt to accurately determine the opinion of both students and faculty on the ROTC question by a comprehensive multiple choice questionnaire. The Committee received about a 50% return rate from both constituent bodies and after careful examination and verification of the results stated, "In short, no clear mandate on ROTC's role is evident in Stanford community opinion."[42] However, their report to the Academic Senate also stated, "The Committee has concluded that given the present climate of opinion at Stanford, ROTC in its existing form is not destined to continue."[43] The Committee noted that the Air Force would leave by June 30, 1971 (due to decreasing enrollment), that the Navy had given notice of its intention to withdraw on May 28, 1970, and that the ". . . University's action following the 1969 Senate resolution constituted sufficient notice [of termination of the Army contract.]"[44]

The Committee made six "short-term" proposals. In summary, they were: No new cadets; attempt to find alternative ROTC placements for prospective cadets entering in the Fall of 1970; ROTC programs remain only as long as necessary to allow currently enrolled students to graduate; and expedite this phase-out by curtailing the program.[45] In addition, the Committee made several "long term" recommendations concerning alternative programs for officer training and national service. (Implementation of these alternatives would rest with the Congress of the United States, not Stanford).

On June 4, 1970, the Senate approved the Mann Report (26-8 vote) and at the end of June this action was affirmed by a 439-282 mail vote of the Academic Council (293 abstentions).

Score: Anti-ROTC 4
Pro-ROTC 3 (Side out)

Dr. Pitzer in June announced his resignation as president, effective August 1, 1970. How ironical that a person who had once remarked to a senior Army official that ". . . ROTC was a peripheral activity at Stanford, and not of sufficient importance to the University that it was an issue on which to stand or fall,"[46] should be brought down, in some measure, by his handling of this "peripheral" issue.

Following the notice of Dr. Pitzer's resignation, both University and DOD officials worked in cooperation to comply with the terms of the Mann Committee recommendations. The Navy, in particular, was concerned with financial support for its midshipmen (all of whom were scholarship students) who were to enter in the Fall of 1970. At that late date neither the University nor DOD could arrange alternate scholarships. As a consequence, with admirable concern for the student, both sides reached a

compromise: new students would be admitted, but they must accelerate their program to complete their Naval studies by the Spring of 1973. The Army was unwilling to accept this compromise ". . . maintaining that Stanford is obliged to honor its existing contract which calls for one year's notice prior to cancellation."[47] Therefore, on September 25, 1970, the new president, Richard W. Lyman, who had been Provost under President Pitzer, notified the Army that Stanford proposed that (1) any incoming students would only be allowed to continue in the program until June, 1973, (2) that no further academic credit would be offered for ROTC, and (3) hoped the Army would be amenable to such a program. President Lyman concluded by, "I am bound to say, finally, that if these proposals, . . . , are not acceptable to the Army, then we must regretfully request a termination of our ROTC program. . . ."[48] The Army adopted the Stanford proposal in October, 1970, and as President Lyman wrote in the Spring of 1971, ". . . we are phasing out our ROTC Unit."[49]

In late 1972 and early 1973 we find a handful of cadets and midshipmen and a small caretaker detachment of military personnel quietly acting out the final steps of the ROTC "decision." There have been a few death rattles such as an extremely strong statement by David Packard, after his resignation as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, condemning institutions which did not support ROTC; Congressman Hebert's attempt to cut off research grants and contracts so that ". . . any institution that cannot tolerate the military taint of ROTC should not be exposed to the military taint of Defense Department research grants and contracts,"[50] and the curtailment of Navy Officer Graduate Student Programs at Stanford. Yet a casual observer watching the detachments methodically prepare their files for retirement and their property for turn-in would scarcely guess

that this was a culmination of a process started some five years previously by a mini-skirted English professor and a young philosopher that had caused:

a. Wracking institutional decisions and counter-decisions.

b. The resignation (probably forced) of a University president.

c. Still-lasting devisiveness and bitterness between and among faculty, students, and the administration.

d. Violence and vandalism of such scale and duration that a great university was reduced to near shambles.

e. A disruption of traditional decision-making power such that roles are still being defined.

THE POLITICAL MODEL AT WORK: WHAT IN THE WORLD HAPPENED?

The interdependent variables of environment, interest groups, faculty and president must be viewed separately in order to understand the functioning of the political system model in the Stanford ROTC decision. In this section we will examine these factors in the following order:

1. The all pervasive influence of the environment.
2. The goals and tactics of partisan interest groups.
3. The newness of the faculty governing structure.
4. The functioning of the new president in a political setting.

Environment is the first variable to be considered. Among the more important of the affective environmental factors was the high tolerance at Stanford for liberals and liberal causes. Herbert Marcuse cites Stanford and Berkeley in a lecture on the "Problem of Violence and

Radical Opposition" as "providing the climate in which so-called 'free universities' and 'critical universities' are founded"[51] outside the structure of the established institutions.

The mild climate, the proximity to the cosmopolitan and international atmosphere of San Francisco, and a historical leniency toward outre life styles made the entire San Francisco Bay Area a mecca for devotees of the so-called "counter culture." Pornography, drugs, unorthodox dress, and a Sybaritic day to day existence combined to give an "anything goes" flavor to the very air. Stanford students, as well as some faculty members, reflected and supported this restraint breaking syndrome. One Stanford University coed stated in a recent magazine article, "There is a certain pressure to be tolerant of everything."[52]

In addition, the huge, sprawling campus was physically "wide open." It was impossible to prevent the intrusion of hordes of local high school students who came to watch and ape their rampaging college counterparts without having to pay the dues for their part in the violence and destruction of University property. The student groups were inspired by a virtual travelling road show of "professional" radicals and activists, who possessing an excellent communications network and high mobility, were capable of moving from campus to campus on the West Coast to fan the flames of confrontation. The early success of the students in quashing classified research at the Applied Electronics Laboratory and the severance of the University-Stanford Research Institute ties indicated a basic vulnerability at Stanford and, consequently, a highly productive target for escalated demands by the riot makers.

These, what might be termed "local" environmental factors, were, of course, merely a sub-set of the extant national scene. The continuing

Selective Service draft was a storm cloud of doubt on the personal horizon of many young college men. President Johnson's style, successful in the halls of Congress, "turned off" many young intellectuals, and President Nixon's apparent failure to meet his campaign promises to wind down the war increased a growing dissatisfaction with the "establishment." This was badly exacerbated by the Laos and Cambodian invasions. The resulting Kent State tragedy, perpetrated by Ohio National Guardsmen, resulted in a student feeling that not only was a person in uniform an enemy, but a direct threat to their freedom and even safety.

The faculty and administration were also subject to this global environment. In particular, there was a "me-too ism" in their desire to emulate and follow the prestige institutions of the East Coast. The actions of Harvard, Columbia, Princeton, and Yale in ousting ROTC after the Cambodia/Kent State trauma, powerfully influenced the governing faculty body.

(An interesting contrast exists at the University of California at Berkeley. This institution, subject to the same environmental factors as Stanford and in the same state of turmoil, retained ROTC, largely because a differing set of power relations kept the decision-making capability in the hands of a conservative Board of Regents).

Secondly, partisans or interest groups operating under the constraints of the external environment have a wide choice of goals and tactics. The goals escalate in importance from (1) influencing a specific issue to (2) influencing a long-range goal or policy to (3) replacing the incumbent decision-makers to finally, (4) altering the basic structure for decision-making.[53] The partisan's bag of tactics include persuasion, inducement, and coercion.[54] These typologies serve as organizing concepts

for analysis of the goals, tactics, and leadership of the interest groups critical to the ROTC decision. In turn, we consider faculty anti-ROTC groups, faculty pro-ROTC groups, the "Off-ROTC Movement" group, and DOD. (We arbitrarily define the ROTC Units as part of the faculty group rather than the DOD interest group).

In analyzing the goals of an amorphous, ever-changing solidary group such as these three informal coalition groups, we were faced with perplexing questions. We must answer questions such as whose goals, when were the goals held, were they "stated" or "real" goals, does activity directed toward one goal that facilitates attainment of a second goal imply acceptance of both goals? We were able to discern several goals that, either through overt announcements or by inference were held by some of the faculty anti-ROTC groups at some of the time during the ROTC decision process. These were:

a. Denial of academic credit to ROTC courses.

b. Removal of ROTC from Stanford.

c. Strengthen the governing role of the faculty vis-a-vis the administration.

d. Demonstrate disapproval of the Vietnamese War.

e. Embarrass the Department of Defense and the Federal Government.

f. Sever all ties between the University and the Department of Defense.

The leadership of the faculty anti-ROTC group was as elusive as the goals. Professors Sneed and Kostelanetz, as mentioned, were the initiators of the first proposal in 1968. However, after this initial thrust both of these young professors (and in particular Professor Sneed) virtually disappeared from the conflict.[55] Professor Van Slyke, an older,

ex-Naval Reserve Officer, was a constant participant until his resignation from the Mann Committee in 1969. Yet, one could scarcely characterize him as the leader. Apparently the anti-ROTC partisan group enjoyed a collective leadership. The faculty members had a wealth of social and professional contacts, some of which had extended over many years. As tactical and strategic decisions were needed, concerned groups would meet in an almost spontaneous fashion. Leadership would evolve, in deference to status, expertise, and innovative approaches to that particular situation. This temporarily localized leadership seemed to carry no guarantee of leadership in the next crisis or decision situation. There was fluid participation, involvement in one crisis, absence in the next go-around.

The tactics of the faculty group were almost entirely persuasive. As Gamson notes, "A confident solidary group will tend to rely on persuasion as a means of influence. . . . the authorities, the group believes, are committed to the same goals and are viewed as its agents."[56] Kostelanetz and Sneed carefully defined the problem initially so that it became an issue to be decided by a faculty decision-making body. This produced a congruence between the political interest group and the authorities. In effect the partisans could state, "We are they." In addition, Professors Kostelanetz and Sneed raised the issue, deliberately or unwittingly, at a time when there was a decision-making vacuum at Stanford that could be filled by faculty governance.

The anti-ROTC faculty group influenced their colleagues by open letters in the student newspaper, circulated petitions, presentations before the several committees that considered the questions, debates at the Faculty Senate and Academic Council, and informal conversations at social events, department meetings, and other gathering places. From an

affirmative viewpoint this was an effective tactic. As noted in our model, this partisan group was "plugged" directly into the faculty decision-making body with no weakening interfaces. In addition, tactics of inducement and coercion would probably have been unsuccessful. There is little inducement that one faculty member could have offered another and a tactic of coercion would have been an anathema to both the initiator and the recipient.

The pro-ROTC faculty group offers some interesting contrasts to the anti-ROTC group. As an example, their goals seem far more sharply defined. In brief, the goals were to:

a. Retain ROTC at Stanford as a viable activity.

b. Protect the interests of the students enrolled or desiring to enroll in ROTC.

In this instance while it would be over-blown to state that the Professors of Military and Naval Science were leaders of this group, they did serve as recognized poles around which faculty pro-ROTC groups clustered. The Army incumbent recognized on his arrival in 1968 that a crisis was in the offing, and as he stated, "I spent two years 'politicking' while I let my subordinates run the Department."[57] Under the circumstances, he probably mustered as much faculty support as humanly possible. The Professor of Naval Science, on the other hand, had a great charismatic appeal among the students. His almost continuous round of "rap" sessions and informal contacts were successful in gaining student support.

Beyond these two individuals we also see a collective leadership similar to the anti-ROTC group.

The faculty group's tactic was also persuasion through the same media as the anti-ROTC group: campus newspaper, petitions and informal meetings. One interesting tactic/counter-tactic was the desire by the pro-ROTC group to avoid voice votes at Academic Council meetings. The pro-ROTC group was aware that voice votes following emotional rhetoric advocating changes could only work to their disadvantage. They, as we have related, were successful in achieving mail balloting at all except the critical May 1, 1969, emergency meeting of the Academic Council.

The goals of the "Off-ROTC Movement" group are difficult to precisely define. In part they overlap the anti-ROTC faculty group's goals as they certainly include:

a. Removal of ROTC from Stanford.

b. Demonstrate disapproval of the Vietnamese War.

c. Embarrass the Department of Defense and the Federal Government.

However, at each end of the spectrum the student group had goals that were disjoint from the faculty group. Most assuredly there was a student element whose principal goal was merely "to raise a little hell" and create a little excitement (the 1969 version of the panty raid) to break up the monotony and pressure of academic life. However, other students decidedly polarized from this frivolous goal (and in accordance with the noted goal escalation) had as objectives:

a. Replacement, or at least neutralization, of the administration and trustee decision-makers.

b. Greater participation of students in the University decision-making.

c. Altering the University to serve as an enclave for further radical activities throughout the Bay Area.

d. Changing the basic structure, form, and ideology of the U. S. Government.

To characterize young radicals such as Michael Sweeney, David Harris, the Schoch brothers, Jeffery Youdelman, and Janet Weiss, as leaders, is somewhat a misnomer. Catalysts is a far better term. The head of the Army ROTC (in spite of having four shot gun blasts through his residence at the height of the controversy), felt these main protagonists were "bright, able, and intelligent but misguided"[58] young people. Without doubt they were masters at motivating mob actions. They were equally adept "word smiths" in explaining and justifying their beliefs and actions and downgrading any opposition.

Gamson could hardly be more prescient in his assertion that "An alienated solidary group will tend to rely on constraints (Gamson defines constraint as '. . . the addition of new disadvantages to the situation or the threat to do so . . .") as a means of influence."[58a] The "Off-ROTC Movement" group's tactics were directed almost solely against the administration (as opposed to the faculty) with lesser emphasis on the Board of Trustees. The basic tactic was disruption, destruction and violence. In retrospect, one must conclude that the tactics were successful -- not that the Administration acceded to student demands, but that the violence, the disruptions, the real threat of the destruction of the University, so paralyzed the administration decision-making that the faculty was free to make an ROTC decision in an uncontested atmosphere.

The Department of Defense in this situation was, at the best, a semi-homogeneous, solidary group during this process as the Army and Navy were not perfectly synchronized. Both the Army and the Navy were concerned about the loss of ROTC units at prestige universities. In particular, the Army felt that other universities in the West were watching the situation at Stanford and were willing to follow Stanford's

lead. The Army was also caught between a rock and a hard place as, while change was necessary to maintain ROTC at Stanford, many college presidents were opposed to any alteration in the ROTC program as they were afraid this might instigate a ROTC problem at their own institutions.[59] The Navy, with a much smaller ROTC program, had reached a collection of schools that they felt represented a true balance of social, cultural, economic, and geographical factors in the United States. Loss of even one institution could upset this balance. Therefore, the goals of DOD were:

a. Maintenance of ROTC at Stanford with the minimum possible change in the program.

b. Maintenance of prestige, i.e., if ROTC was to leave the school, the school must request DOD to leave rather than DOD leaving voluntarily.

The Army had a long chain of command through several headquarters to the Pentagon. However, the real leadership was provided by the Commanding General of the Sixth U. S. Army (an organization that encompassed all Army activities in the Far West). The Commanding General "Swede" Larsen, found, to his surprise, that ROTC at Stanford was one of his major command problems.[60] He personally had a hand in developing the modified Army ROTC program that was adopted in early 1969, and had several meetings with President Pitzer concerning ROTC. However, he had no leverage with any of the faculty groups and his influence on the Faculty Senate and the Academic Council, as shown in the model, was filtered through the President's office.

The Navy, by contrast, went straight from the Pentagon to Stanford. The Navy's leader in the process was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, James D. Hittle, a retired Marine Brigadier General, and a

"hard liner." His pressure was applied solely on President Pitzer and not on the faculty group which made the final decision.

DOD represents Gamson's neutral solidary group which ". . . will tend to rely on inducements as a means of influence."[61] The tactics of DOD are obscure. Certainly both services encouraged President Pitzer to hold the line on ROTC, and the Army offered a compromise program in an attempt to satisfy the faculty objections. However, they did little else, and it is not apparent what other resources they could have brought to bear to save ROTC at Stanford.

Looking at the faculty as a third variable, we must keep in mind that the new organization of the faculty became operative in September of 1968, and was partially a reflection of the size and complexity of the faculty body. In the decade between 1960 and 1970 the faculty increased in number from 619 to 1,200. The academic capabilities of the University were, in turn, expanded by many new departments and disciplines, including the addition of a complete medical faculty and hospital facilities which were moved to Palo Alto from San Francisco.

Since the early 1960's was a time when there was a shortage of qualified teachers and researchers, Stanford, like many other universities, had to recruit and employ much younger personnel than had previously been the case in order to staff its expanded programs. These younger men and women, many of whom had received their formal education during the days of the civil rights movement and the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, were more impatient than their older colleagues with collegiate bureaucratic ways, more anxious to have change reflect the popular mores of the time, and even intemperate of the established institutional traditions and the styles of leadership and decision making.

It was to meet these expectations of the new faculty and in order to provide a structure for greater faculty involvement in the decision making process that the new Academic Council and the Faculty Senate were formed in 1968. However, the decision making role of these bodies and the exercise of their powers was so new as to be almost exploratory when the ROTC issue was introduced. Both faculty and administration had high expectations about the role and impact of the Faculty Senate. This was one of a small number of pioneering efforts in faculty governance in the United States and Stanford was being watched by its academic and administrative colleagues. Questions might be raised about the appropriateness of having the Faculty Senate consider credit for a particular department of the University. However, the hoped for potential of the new governing structure, plus the long-standing, if unused, tradition of faculty involvement in credit granting decisions of this type, plus the consensus decision-making format favored by the incoming president, all pointed to the faculty as the decision-making agency in this instance. This approach is identified early in the Sneed/Kostelanetz statement tying a faculty decision on credit for ROTC to the future prestige of the Senate.[62] This was part of the myth making function of the anti-ROTC forces.

One example of administrative inexperience was in the appointment of committee members by the Senate Committee on Committees. They attempted to achieve a balanced viewpoint on the ROTC issue by initial placing and refilling vacancies with equal numbers of people representing polar positions. This tactic, rather than insuring a spirit of compromise and representative discussion, resulted in a lack of agreement and divided recommendations.[63]

The inexperience of the Senate in dealing with sensitive matters can be seen in the way in which they:

1. Relied heavily on their committee structure for input and problem resolution. Frequently there was little debate on recommendations of the committee. An interesting observation about the compliance of the Senate was made by Professor Connolly when he said, "I was shocked that the Senate adopted the Majority Report (of the Connolly Committee) with no debate."

2. Approved controversial recommendations such as the initial Sneed/Kostelanetz proposal without referring to the Academic Council. Established an ad hoc implementing committee which suggested courses of action somewhat contrary to the original mandate of the Senate.

3. Concluded controversial action on credit for ROTC usually by a large voting margin. However, in referendum votes, the faculty was split fairly evenly, thereby raising the question of the representiveness of the Senate and its ability to reflect the views of its constituents.

Further, it is interesting to note that having made a decision on the removal of credit for ROTC on April 4, 1969 (which was subsequently upheld by the mail vote of the Academic Council), the Senate on January 22, 1970, essentially reversed the faculty position when it approved a plan which would permit limited academic credit on a one-year trial basis. Despite the influence of President Pitzer in advocating this trial approach, it was in fact a Senate reversal of position rather than an attempt to compromise a difficult situation. The Senate, had it been a more experienced decision-making group, might have upheld its previous action on this critical issue in view of the President's not having taken a strong, prior position for or against ROTC. In addition, the pressure from the DOD, the Trustees, and the alumni was minimal, but the Academic Council also approved this reversal.

The final example of decision reversal in the granting of credit for ROTC occurred on May 1, 1970. The Faculty Council, acting prior to

Senate deliberation, recommended that the Senate terminate credit. The Senate concurred and another referendum was held. The decision to end credit carried by a slender margin in 1969, reversed in early 1970, was again reversed, this time by a massive majority. In all fairness to the entire faculty and to the Senate especially, it should be noted that the final actions on ROTC in May and June, 1970, occurred during the difficult times surrounding the invasion of Cambodia and the trauma at Kent State.

A participant on the Mann Advisory Committee emphasized that the final report of the Committee to the Senate on June 1, 1970, was intended to be a finding of fact about the status of ROTC rather than a recommendation.[64] This "finding of fact" was a reflection that:

1. The policy of the University to remove ROTC academic credit had become established by the faculty more than a year before.
2. The ROTC situation on campus was fluid since ROTC was in the process of withdrawing.
3. The contractual obligations between the military services and the University were legally binding and should be observed in fairness to participating students.
4. There was intense political pressure from all sides of the issue and more violence would result if the University chose any other course of action than that of removing ROTC from the campus in accordance with the spirit of the faculty position in April, 1969.[65]

Therefore, with all of these items taken into consideration, the Committee had little choice but to again recommend the termination of ROTC within legal, contractual guidelines.

From the actions taken by the Senate and by the Academic Council, it is apparent that the report of the Mann Committee was taken as recommendations for action exclusively. The emotional context of the

environment at the time may also have blurred the distinction between fact-finding and recommendations, but it does underscore the observation that the Senate was feeling pressure to act without due deliberation and in haste. This point illustrates the communication and organizational problems within the faculty governmental structure but does not suggest that the outcome might have been different at this late stage of the ROTC conflict.

The last variable to be considered is the University presidency. The overriding importance of the external environment, the proliferation of interest groups on campus, and the combination of an ambitious but inexperienced faculty governance system, suggests that to be successful, Stanford's president had to be politically savvy. Simply, the political model indicates that system decision-makers must have a political systems perspective in order to control events.

Before Dr. Pitzer set foot on Stanford soil, developments and precedents were occurring which would clearly act as constraints on his presidency and even further magnify the requirement for skilled political management.

Despite scattered instances of violence on the campus as early as the mid-1960's, administrative counter-tactics did not include police action. Even the first massive sit-in demonstration in May of 1968 over the campus judicial system failed to initiate strong action from the president's office, despite the fact that Dr. Sterling was regarded by many as intolerant of rule-breaking and violence. During the interim presidency of Dr. Glaser, the campus erupted over University policy toward classified research by faculty members and the activities of the Stanford Research Institute. But the only counter-action forthcoming from the

University administration was the establishment of a Stanford-SRI Study Committee. A policy of firm and immediate action in the case of violence and disruption was lacking.

Dr. Glaser's administration tied the hands of his successor in another important respect. As we have noted, far-reaching reforms were being implemented during this period with the establishment of the Faculty Senate. Although Dr. Glaser had requested guidance for the interim period, Pitzer never issued any particular instructions. As one highly respected Stanford professor put it, Pitzer gave Glaser a free hand to meet the needs of the University as they arose.[66]

When Dr. Pitzer assumed office in December of 1968, he had had no direct experience with these far-reaching activities and little knowledge of the key personalities involved. Having no real constituency, he had little political leverage.

Perhaps the most significant limitations to this effectiveness as Stanford's president were his personality and his conception of campus leadership. Pitzer, nervous and ill at ease in large groups and not an articulate speaker, did not come across well in public.[67] His rule-by-consensus style, developed during his seven years as the president of Rice University, was inappropriate at Stanford. He did, however, recognize differences in atmosphere between the two insitutions. As he told a Stanford Daily reporter during a series of interviews in February of 1972, "When I came to Stanford, it was perfectly obvious that there were going to be pressures in terms of student radicalism and the demonstrations." (February 8).[68] But he continued to adhere to his informal, "reasoning together" style. He handled his first Stanford protest by asking the

members of the Students for a Democratic Society to talk informally with him outside his office. It was Pitzer's consistent position that he could deal rationally with members of the Stanford community and that whatever discipline might be necessary would be self-imposed. Looking back, however, in 1972, Pitzer comments that:

> I think there was a trend -- and maybe it moved faster and further than I saw or I wanted to think was the case -- in which both students and faculty were unduly reluctant to discipline one another internally.[69]

Pitzer did not hesitate to speak out against the Vietnam War and Washington policies. But while these statements were not effective in endearing him to the protesting faculty and students, they did serve to set alumni and members of the Board of Trustees against him.

Apparently realizing the inadequacy of his non-directed style of leadership, Pitzer finally moved against protesting students and non-students but only hesitantly and ineffectively. Police were called in May of 1969 when students occupied Encina Hall, but there were rumors that the Provost Lyman (now Stanford's president) had largely made this decision. However, after this initial show at force, police were used only intermittently throughout the ROTC "trashing" period. From our analysis, it is an understatement to say that ROTC officials were less than enthusiastic over the protective actions taken by the president.[70]

In fairness to Pitzer, it is important to note that there were factors beyond his control which negatively color his administration. Aside from the precedents set by his predecessors and the decentralization of campus governance just prior to his presidency, he chose to rely on a supporting staff largely loyal to Provost Lyman, who, rumor has it, was

passed over for the presidency.[71] Commenting on this factor, Pitzer admitted there were difficulties.

> I think when any group has sort of been working together for a long time and somebody else comes in who is somewhat different, there can't help but be some minor problems. . . . There's no question but that Dr. Lyman as Provost had a staff . . . who had been working with him closely for a considerable period of time. They had adjusted styles and so forth, and this had its perfectly natural role.[72]

But perhaps the most significant misfortune occurred in the midst of the ROTC controversy when Pitzer's chief advisor on ROTC matters, Vice Provost Howard Brooks, revealed that he had been under consideration for a Defense Department job both before the negotiation on the Army compromise began and again after the negotiations had ended. Pitzer at the time defended Brooks' loyalty but in retrospect admitted "there was a question as to whether he was the best choice or not" and that another negotiator might have been more effective "in terms tactically of gaining faculty acceptance of the outcome."[73]

Following this disclosure, Brooks withdrew as a negotiator and Pitzer was largely on his own. Pitzer and a close advisor considered substitutes but could find no one to fill Brooks' role.[74] From April, 1970, on, Pitzer was without counsel in this area. In response to questioning as to why Provost Lyman had not played a more significant role in this area, this source said simply, "Because the president hadn't asked him to."[75]

A key, then, to the ROTC outcome is the lack of decisive leadership coming from the president's office. Had Pitzer been politically astute, uncompromising on campus violence, and had had time to develop a base of power and a constituency, perhaps he could have overcome the

handicaps -- handicaps compounded by the external environment -- which any new man would have experienced upon assuming the presidency of Stanford in December of 1968. However, he did not, and consequently the ROTC decision was not his.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing analysis we conclude:

Conclusion 1.

The political model, because of its emphasis on the process and recognition of a variety of factors affecting decision making, is best suited for this analysis. An educational institution such as Stanford, complex in organization, multi-purpose, where constituents do not relate to one another in a hierarchical pattern, can best be described by a political model.

Scholars, grounded in traditions of logic and reasoning, have a tendency when the tumult and shouting have faded from memory, to conjure up a picture of rational processes having produced decisions. Present Vice Provost William Miller in a 1972 letter on the ROTC decision to a local newspaper gives the impression that only academic considerations were at stake. He alludes generally to other factors in the decision but discounts them in favor of a rational single focus on the problem. The evidence clearly indicates the contrary. The rational man model (see Appendix A) was not at work in the ROTC decision. The efforts at achieving a compromise solution at Stanford were doomed when a highly charged political atmosphere caused a crisis reaction under the influence of massive external pressures.

Conclusion 2.

We have attempted in a rough qualitative sense to plot the value of several critical state variables as a function of time (using an ordinal scale defined in Figure 4). We do not suggest that the true functional relations are linear and smooth as in our over-simplification, that each variable deserves equal weight at a particular period of time, or that there is no possible cause-effect relationship among or between the variables. However, we do conclude that the confluence of so many of the variables at a nadir (from a pro-ROTC perspective) at the same time allowed the de facto ROTC decision to be made by the faculty and to be a decision in favor of removal of ROTC. We further conclude that although it would be presumptious and rash to unequivocally state that such a decision could not have been made at other time frames (in the summer of 1966, for example) that examination of the state variables indicates this to be unlikely.

Conclusion 3.

None of the four dominant interest groups (pro-ROTC faculty, anti-ROTC faculty, "Off-ROTC Movement," and DOD) had what might be termed overwhelming resources for leverage with the University decision-makers. Yet a comparison of the efficacy of the two faculty groups, the student group, and DOD, leads to what should have been an obvious truism: apply your influence as directly on the decision-making body as possible. There is evidence that DOD never fully appreciated this maxim.

Conclusion 4.

We further conclude that the new faculty decision-making system was not sufficiently experienced to deal with major institutional issues, and

Figure 4: State Variables as a Function of Time



LEGEND:

+3 - Highly favorable to ROTC retention
+2 - Moderately favorable to ROTC retention.
+1 - Mildly favorable to ROTC retention
0 - Neutral
-1 - Mildly favorable to ROTC removal.
-2 - Moderately favorable to ROTC removal.
-3 - Highly favorable to ROTC removal.

that, as evidence of the experience, the Senate Committee on Committees precluded a reasonable outcome to the ROTC issue in appointing polarized members to the ROTC committees. Consensus and compromise can best be arrived at when "centerists" are selected as committee members rather than those from "irrevocably committed" extremes.

Conclusion 5.

Finally, our analysis suggests that the combination of a determined opposition, a decentralized decision-making system, and a politically weak president make change, once in motion, hard to stop. As we have seen, the ROTC "decision" was actually a series of decisions. Opponents of ROTC were able to direct pressure for change at many points within the Stanford decision-making system and under the force of events were even able to get previously made decisions resurrected for further deliberation. Massive unrest by the constituents of institutions of higher learning was unprecedented. For most of this century, American colleges and universities were governed by strong presidents. It is perhaps unfortunate that decentralization of decision-making power was occurring at Stanford and elsewhere at the very time the pressure of events called for skilled and strong leadership. We conclude that contingency plans and basic organizational capacity for crisis decision-making were non-existent at Stanford.

ROTC REVISITED

The ending of the Vietnam War and the draft has brought a relative degree of peace to most campuses. Students no longer feel threatened as to their future. Faculty frustration concerning the Vietnam War has subsided. A survey of the campus battlefield reveals 17 colleges and

universities dropped ROTC programs. (See Appendix D). As of December, 1972, there were 136 colleges with applications on file with the Department of Defense requesting establishment of at least one of the three Armed Services ROTC programs. No withdrawals have been requested since October, 1970.

Locally what we have witnessed in the Stanford decision was a confluence of forces resulting in a political equation on the ROTC matter which could be described as a function of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon, the faculty, the students, and ROTC culminating in confrontation with the administration. The formula appeared to be evolving before Cambodia and Kent State in a form that might have produced a different result had it been the function of the Vietnam War, a flexible Pentagon, a flexible faculty, a flexible administration, a flexible student body, a flexible ROTC department, and a secret student ballot on the issue, resulting in either an accommodation or ROTC's removal by a democratically arrived at decision. That equation altered by events external to the University, was not to be. The faculty decision was made and the Khaki Submarine at Stanford, its bouyancy gone, sank slowly from sight. What slipped under the waves at Stanford, however, was less ROTC as a substantive issue than it was a symbol of frustration over broader issues external to the University and beyond the control of the elements that make up the Institution. There was only one target in uniform at Stanford. The alternatives were few! The choice was simple! The outcome fixed!

APPENDIX A

GOALS OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY

1. The Founding Grant states:

> Its [the University's] nature, that of a university with such seminaries of learning as shall make it of the highest grade, including mechanical institutes, museums, galleries of art, laboratories and conservatories, together with all things necessary for the study of agriculture in all its branches, and for mechanical training, and the studies and exercises directed to the cultivation and enlargement of the mind;
>
> Its object to qualify its students for personal success, and direct usefulness in life;
>
> And its purposes, to promote the public welfare by exercising an influence in behalf of humanity and civilization, teaching the blessings of liberty regulated by law, and inculcating love and reverence for the great principles of government as derived from the inalienable rights of man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

2. The Stanford Study of Undergraduate Education, 1954-1956, identified the goals as being:

> . . . to achieve breadth of knowledge -- knowledge of the elements of our cultural heritage; to achieve depth of knowledge -- such depth of knowledge will serve different purposes for different individuals; to develop one's interests and abilities and clarify one's values.

3. The Study of Education at Stanford produced a faculty generated hierarchy of goals:

> First, the pursuit of truth and knowledge.
> Second, the liberal education of students.
> Third, the professional education of students.

The Study of Education at Stanford cites on page 35 of the Appendix of The Study and Purposes the comment of a faculty member coming from the world of industry. In relating to his previous job he said:

> At Stanford I have found it quite different. At first I was amused at the naivete exhibited by mature faculty in their lack

of organization and planning, whether on departmental or school-wide levels, or university committees, or the administration itself. We at Stanford seem to avoid thinking about problems by calling upon revered cliches as 'academic freedom,' 'research,' 'relevance,' 'involvement,' 'commitment,' 'concern,' -- all of which are very unimportant to the matter at hand. But now it is no longer amusing to find that we are always reacting to situations and coming up with expedient solutions.

This sums up the conditions in which the ROTC Decision was made.

APPENDIX B

CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

The study of organizations has been considerably broadened with the development of theoretical models to analyze on-going organizational processes. Three models predominate: the rational model, the bureaucratic model, and the political model. The rational model views the process of organizational decision-making much like the actions of a rational man in making a decision. In solving a problem, the rational man is conscious of his goals, identifies options, evaluates consequences, and then chooses a solution which will maximize his goals with the least cost. The analagous rational organizational process is centrally controlled; the organizational decision-makers are completely informed; and, they develop policy on a value maximizing basis.

Decision-making as analyzed through the bureaucratic model is largely controlled by organizational rules and procedures, irrespective of degrees of rationality. Organizational rules determine who formulates policy and standard operating procedures determine how they go about it. Policy today is determined largely by what happened yesterday. In the words of Graham Allison:

> The best explanation of an organization's behavior at t (a given point in time) is t - 1; the best prediction of what will happen at t + 1 is t. (This model's) explanatory power is achieved by uncovering the organizational routines and repertories that produced the output. . . ." (Cuban Missile Crisis) [76]

A good example is the workings of a governmental civil service system.

The political model examines organizational decision-making as a product of interactions among competing subsystems of the organization and wit external environment. This model assumes that conflict stemming from divergent values and vested interests is inevitable and is, in fact,

healthy between competing interest groups. These interest groups bring pressure to bear on authorities in the organization through coalitions and bargaining, utilizing a variety of tactics. By a process, then, of pulling and hauling, decisions are made. A United States Congressman would feel at home with this model.

Figure 1b compares these three basic conceptual models.

Figure 1b: Comparison of the three models.

	RATIONAL	BUREAUCRATIC	POLITICAL
Characterization	Rational Man	Standard Operating Procedures	Political Bargaining
Example	Computer	Civil Service	Congress
Focus of Analysis	Action as choice	Action as Organizational Output	Action as Political Resultant
Organizational Decision Process	The Problem Organizational Goals and Objectives Known Decision-making as rational choice by authorities: -option search -consequence analysis -choice based on maximization of value preference -feedback	Organizationally-determined factors: -fractionated power -parochial priorities and perceptions -goals limited to meeting organizationally determined acceptable performance Decision-Making according to: -Standard Op. Procedures -programs and repertories -uncertainty avoidance Incremental learning & change Central coordination and control	Authorities/Partisans -divergent goals and interests Decision-Making according to: -coalitions and pressure tactics -negotiation and bargaining -monitoring of implementation
Conflict	Abnormal: controlled by organizational sanctions	Abnormal: controlled by organizational sanctions	Normal: basic to analysis of policy formation
External Environment and Personalities of actors	Minor factors	Minor factors	Major factors
Inference about decision process	Organization action = choice with regard to objectives	Organization action = output largely determined by Std. Op. Procedures and programs	Organization action = resultant of bargaining among divergent interest groups

Most observers would acknowledge that a university is made up of diverse components, but many would consider them to work in harmony as a "community of scholars." John Millett, writing in The Academic Community, comments that "The concept of community presupposes an organization in which functions are differentiated and in which specialization must be brought together, or coordination if you will, is achieved not through a structure of superordination and subordination of persons and groups but through a dynamic of consensus."[77]

New and recent expressions of cultural pluralism have highlighted the multifaceted social system of the campus and its complex interactions. And, as Baldridge points out, conflict is an inevitable produce of a complex social system.

> The complex social structure generates conflict and struggles over goals; it also leads to the development of many interest groups that use elaborate tactics to influence policy decisions. In a word, the social setting creates a complex 'demand structure' that impinges on the decision makers.[78]

The emotional consideration of the ROTC decision, its uniqueness, and the importance of environmental factors, all lead the analyst away from rational man and bureaucratic models and toward the political model.

APPENDIX C

ESCALATING PARTISAN GOALS

BALDRIDGE'S[79] ESCALATING GOALS	ANNOUNCED GOALS ARE TAKEN FROM THE ANTI-ROTC MOVEMENT STATEMENT, APRIL 6, 1970
a. Influencing a specific issue	The most obvious objective is the total elimination of ROTC from the campus.
b. Influencing long range policy	...it serves further notice to universities nationwide that ROTC is a losing gamble, that rather than wait for the final confrontation they might eliminate it now while looking to sources outside DOD for financial support.
c. Replacement of the incumbent decision-making	The movement is pressing its effort to establish such [rational] dialogue by making its objectives and concurrent activities public, and by openly inviting discussion in affinity groups, mass meetings, and campus living quarters.
d. Altering the basic structure for decision making	...it seems the issue will have to resolved through force. ...power in the people's hands would move to eliminate ROTC.

APPENDIX D

ROTC DROP OUT CHART

STATE (No. of schools dropping ROTC/No. of schools with ROTC)

SCHOOL	ARMY	NAVY	AF
CALIFORNIA (1/16)			
Stanford University	X	X	X
CONNECTICUT (2/3)			
Trinity College			X
Yale University	X	X	
MASSACHUSETTS (4/6)			
Boston College	X		
Boston University	X		
Harvard University	X	X	X
Tufts University		X	X
NEW HAMPSHIRE (1/2)			
Dartmouth College	X		
NEW JERSEY (1/7)			
Princeton University *	X	X	X
NEW YORK (6/19)			
Colgate University	X		
Columbia University	X	X	
Hobart & Wm. Smith College			X
New York University	X		X
Pratt Institute	X		
State Univ. of New York at Buffalo	X		
RHODE ISLAND (1/2)			
Brown University		X	X

* Princeton had programmed ROTC to be completely phased out by June 1972, however that policy was reversed and Princeton negotiated a contract with the Army for ROTC in a different structural form from the traditional.

FOOTNOTES

Personal interviews referred to in the footnotes are identified as follows:

1. Dean Robert L. Thomas of Menlo College -- Former Professor of Naval Science, Colonel, USMC (Ret.)
2. Stanley Ramey - Former Professor of Military Science, Colonel, USA (Ret.)
3. Mr. Frederic O. Glover - Secretary to the University.
4. Dr. Thomas Connolly - Stanford Faculty.
5. Dr. Keith Mann - Stanford Faculty.
6. Dr. Victor Baldridge - Stanford Faculty.
7. Dr. Howard Brooks - Provost, Claremont Colleges.
8. Mr. Richard Brenner - Doctoral Candidate.

1. Interview # 3
2. Ibid.
3. Elliot, Orrin L., Stanford University, the First 25 Years, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1937).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Scott, W. R., "Theories of Organization" in Handbook of Modern Sociology, F. Faris, Ed., (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).
7. Stanford Daily, February 12, 1970.
8. San Francisco Chronicle, February 16, 1969.
9. Stanford Observer, January, 1969.
10. Interview #8.
11. San Francisco Chronicle, op. cit.
12. ROTC at Stanford: A Faculty Proposal, September 1, 1968.
13. Ibid.
14. Campus Report Supplement, #4, February 11, 1969.
15. Letter from Vice Provost Howard Brooks to the Honorable W. K. Brenan, October 1, 1968.
16. Campus Report, op. cit.
17. Ibid. p. 4.

18. Campus Report, op. cit., p. 8.
19. Minutes of the Academic Council, February 13, 1969.
20. Stanford News Release, March 11, 1969.
21. Ibid.
22. Interview #2.
23. Stanford News Release, May 2, 1969.
24. Memorandum from Professor Bach to President Pitzer, May 5, 1969.
25. Interview #4
26. Memorandum for the Record, Col. Stanley Ramey, 17 July 1969.
27. Memorandum from Col. Stanley Ramey to Vice Provost Howard Brooks, October 22, 1969.
28. Memorandum from President Pitzer to Professor Alan Manne, October 30, 1969.
29. Memorandum from the President's Advisory Committee on ROTC Affairs to President Pitzer, January 12, 1970.
30. Memorandum from Professors Alan Manne and L. Van Slyke to President Pitzer, January 9, 1970.
31. Memorandum from President Pitzer to the Academic Senate Steering Committee, January 16, 1970.
32. Minutes of Academic Council, January 22, 1970.
33. Interview #2.
34. Memorandum from Professor Kahn to Professor Winbigler, February 16, 1970.
35. Ibid.
36. Stanford News Release, April 1, 1970.
37. Ibid.
38. Interview #2.
39. Minutes of the Academic Senate, April 30, 1970.
40. Campus Report, May 6, 1970.
41. Campus Report, May 14, 1970.

42. Campus Report, "Supplement #2", June 3, 1970.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Memorandum for the Record, Col. Ramey, January 24, 1969.

47. Stanford News Release, September, 1970.

48. Letter from President Lyman to Mr. Brehm, September 25, 1970.

49. Letter from President Lyman to General Larsen, April 15, 1971.

50. San Francisco Examiner, May 4, 1972.

51. Marcuse Herbert, Five Lectures, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 88.

52. Faltermayer, Edmund, "Youth After the Revolution," Fortune, March, 1973, p. 147.

53. Baldridge, J. Victor, Power and Conflict in the University, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 153. See Appendix C for illustration of this escalation.

54. Ibid.

55. A close observer suggests that demands of teaching and research to satisfy the requirements for tenure precluded prolonged active participation by junior faculty members.

56. Gamson, William A., Power and Discontent, (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press, 1960), p. 164.

57. Interview #2.

58. Ibid.

58a. Gamson, op. cit., p. 169.

59. Interview #2.

60. Private Memorandum, March 3, 1971.

61. Gamson, op. cit., p. 168.

62. Sneed/Kostalanetz Memorandum, September, 1968.

63. Interview #2.

64. Interview #5.

65. Campus Report, "Supplement #2", June 1, 1970.

66. Interview #5.

67. Interviews #2 and #3.

68. Stanford Daily, February 8, 1972.

69. Stanford Daily, February 9, 1972.

70. Interview #1.

71. Stanford Daily, February 11, 1972.

72. Ibid.

73. Stanford Daily, February 10, 1972.

74. Interview #5.

75. Ibid.

76. Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).

77. Millett, John The Academic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

78. Baldridge, J. Victor Power and Conflict in the University (New York: Wiley, 1971).

79. Ibid.